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The World Economy 
Rather attention was focussed on the need 
to defuse protectionist sentiment through 
co-ord ina ted e f f o r t s to r eve r se the 
strength of the dollar. The significance 
of the G5 meeting i s not only that the 
major problem facing the world economy is 
identified as the need to achieve orderly 
c o r r e c t i o n t o t r a d e and payments 
imbalances but that the US Government now 
accepts intervention is necessary to lower 
the dol lar ' s value. This l a t t e r element 
contrasts sharply with the ea r l i e r US 
contention that exchange ra te adjustment 
should follow from the pursuit of more 
r a p i d g rowth in o t h e r i n d u s t r i a l 
economies. Acceptance of the need for 
g r e a t e r i n t e r v e n t i o n to o f f s e t the 
implications of slower world growth i s 
also reflected in the Baker Plan for 
tackling the immediate debt problems of 
developing countries. 
OUTPUT 
After the narked deceleration in the f i rs t 
half of the year US growth shows signs of 
picking up in the l a t t e r part of 1985. 
However, the impetus to world trade and 
global expansion derived from the rapid 
period of US growth in late 1983 and early 
1984 has now largely waned. Although 
European countries and Japan are set to 
continue the i r recent expansion, i t i s 
unlikely that their growth will offset the 
impact on the world economy of a slower 
rate of US growth. 
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The l a s t few months have seen increasing 
concern about slowing g lobal growth. 
Fears heightened over the implications of 
a continuing relatively strong dollar, the 
growing p r o t e c t i o n i s t demands in the 
United States and the debt problems of 
developing countries. The recent meeting 
of the Group of Five (G5) produced no 
substantive proposals to promote growth. 
The deceleration in US output growth in 
the second half of 1984 and the f i r s t 
quarter of 1985 has been reversed in 
successive quarters in 1985. During the 
f i r s t three months of 1985 real output 
grew at an annual ra te of 0.3$. Recovery 
in the second quarter raised the real 
annual rate of growth during the f i rs t six 
months of the year to \%. Following an 
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in i t ia l "flash" estimate from the Commerce 
Department of an annual rate of growth of 
2.8% fo r t h e t h i r d q u a r t e r , t h e 
preliminary estimate showed some upward 
revision to 3%. Such upward revision 
contrasts with the downwards revisions 
necessary in preceding quarters. Further 
expansion i s forecast for the fourth 
quarter but i s likely to fall far short of 
the growth requi red to achieve the 
Administration's forecast of a 3% r ise in 
real output for 1985 as a whole. 
Relatively slow US output growth during 
the second quarter of 1985 depressed the 
annualised ra te of aggregate indus t r ia l 
growth in the OECD c o u n t r i e s . In 
addition, the US growth ra te f e l l some 
distance short of the growth rates of 
other major OECD countries for the second 
successive quarter. Japan and the UK, for 
example, enjoyed annualised growth ra tes 
of 5.4% and 4.7% respectively. Of the 
major OECD countries only France with a 
r a t e of 0.2? experienced l e s s rapid 
expansion than the US. 
As in the f i r s t quarter, weak US output 
performance contrasted with the continuing 
buoyancy of consumer spending. During the 
f i r s t six months of the year consumer 
spending rose at a real annual rate of 5%. 
This follows the now well-established 
pattern in the US and led to increasing 
imports. With imports r i s ing by US$1bn 
and expor ts f a l l i n g by US$2.5bn, the 
merchandise trade deficit rose to US$33bn 
from US$29.5bn in the f i r s t quarter. The 
trade de f i c i t was pa r t i a l ly offset by a 
net increase in earnings from services to 
produce a current account deficit for the 
second quarter of US$31.8bn. 
The US current account def ic i t has i t s 
counterpart in the surpluses recorded 
elsewhere, as for example in West Germany 
and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , Japan and in the 
improvements on cu r r en t account so 
important to debt-burdened developing 
countries. Pressure on Japan, the major 
bene f i c i a ry of the US growth-induced 
expansion of world trade during 1982-84, 
and Japanese proposals on measures aimed 
a t c o r r e c t i n g i t s s u b s t a n t i a l t r ade 
surplus, the "import-action programme", 
were discussed in the l a s t Commentary. 
Japan has also recently announced measures 
designed to expand demand and which will 
l e a v e t h e J a p a n e s e economy l e s s 
susceptible to lower US growth. 
The measures introduced in Japan involve 
the br inging forward of investment 
programmes by p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s , 
accelerated public works programmes, an 
additional injection of public investment 
by loca l a u t h o r i t i e s and a d d i t i o n a l 
expenditure on construction. Consumer 
credit controls on durable goods are also 
being relaxed. I t is expected that these 
measures wi l l add 1.3% to GNP during the 
presen t f i s c a l year . The Japanese 
Government remains reluctant, however, to 
provide any monetary expansion since the 
associated lower interest rates would tend 
to lower the value of the yen and, 
thereby, exacerbate demands within the US 
for greater protectionism. 
Among European economies, West Germany, 
has been under considerable pressure from 
internat ional agencies such as the OECD, 
other European governments and domestic 
sources to undertake expansion to 
compensate for the slowdown in the world 
economy. Like other European governments, 
however, the West German Government 
eliminates from i t s policy options the 
poss ib i l i ty of f iscal expansion in the 
form of increased government expenditure 
on the grounds t h a t such an option 
t h r e a t e n s the ob jec t ive of reducing 
inflation. As with the miners' dispute in 
the UK, l a s t year's s t r ikes in German 
vehicle manufacturing and metal industries 
complicate comparisons between 1984 and 
1985. However, investment and consumer 
expenditure have been expanding rapidly in 
recent quarters and both are forecast to 
provide a stimulus to the economy in the 
coming year. 
In both France and I taly the over-riding 
target of policy remains the public sector 
borrowing requirement. In September the 
French Government announced reductions in 
public expenditure in real terms to permit 
reductions in personal and corpora te 
taxation. Overall, i t i s intended to 
contain the budget def ic i t at 3% of GDP. 
In I ta ly the Government intends reducing 
expenditure to lower the budget def ic i t 
from a 1985 level of 15.6% of GDP to 14.6% 
of GDP in 1986. 
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While there i s much se l f -congratula t ion in 
some European countries t ha t growth ra tes 
are now higher than in the US, the absence 
of expansionary p o l i c i e s augurs badly 
a g a i n s t the background of s lowing world 
t r a d e . W i t h o n l y J a p a n t a k i n g 
ref la t ionary act ion, t o t a l OECD growth i s 
l ike ly to enter a more sluggish period. 
LABOUR MARKETS 
After r i s ing in the f i r s t quarter of 1985 
unemployment f e l l in the second quarter to 
the l e v e l of the l a s t t h r e e months of 
1984. The standardised unemployment r a t e 
f e l l from 8.2% t o 8 .1? . D e s p i t e t h e 
d e c e l e r a t i o n of US growth in the f i r s t 
half of the year, the US unemployment r a t e 
of 7.2% remained s i m i l a r t o t h a t in the 
l a t t e r half of 1984. Although in response 
to a f a l l in t h e Canadian unemployment 
ra te from 11.1% to 10.5%, unemployment in 
North America decreased from 7.6% to 7-5%. 
North America's unemployment r a t e remains 
much lower than in Europe. Rates of 
unemployment in OECD Europe and the EEC 
remained unchanged a t 11.0% and 10.9% 
respect ive ly . 
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Within Europe higher second quarter l eve l s 
of unemployment were recorded for West 
Germany and t h e UK. D e c r e a s e s in 
unemployment took place in Belgium, I t a l y , 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
A f t e r s u c c e s s i v e f a l l s i n t h e t h r e e 
p rev ious q u a r t e r s the downward t r end in 
Japanese unemployment was ar res ted in the 
second quar ter of 1985. The unemployment 
r a t e of 2.5% in Japan i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
l e s s than t h a t in the o t h e r major OECD 
count r ies . 
Despite increasing employment in Europe, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in the s e r v i c e s e c t o r , OECD 
f o r e c a s t s s u g g e s t t h a t E u r o p e a n 
unemployment i s l i k e l y t o r i s e t o 11.25% 
by the end of 1986. Unemployment r a t e s in 
the US and Japan a r e expected t o be much 
lower than in Europe a t 7.25% and 2.5% 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . European output growth i s 
u n l i k e l y to g e n e r a t e s u f f i c i e n t jobs t o 
p revent h ighe r unemployment given the 
expected increases in labour supply. This 
s t r u c t u r a l change in European l abour 
marke ts has been d i scus sed in e a r l i e r 
Conmentaries. 
The na tu re of Government p o l i c i e s t o 
t a c k l e unemployment in Europe has been 
shaped by the view t h a t unemployment i s 
l a r g e l y a consequence of labour market 
r i g i d i t i e s . Thus, governments are seeking 
t o a b o l i s h o r r e f o r m i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
a r rangements such as wages c o u n c i l s , t o 
remove ar rangements for wage indexa t ion 
and, more general ly , to change l e g i s l a t i o n 
governing employment c o n d i t i o n s . In 
c o n t r a s t t o the Japanese programme of 
a c c e l e r a t e d inves tmen t in u t i l i t i e s and 
construction, European governments remain 
s e t a g a i n s t t h e u s e of m e a s u r e s t o 
s t i m u l a t e employment d i r ec t ly . Reliance 
on l abour market reform holds l i t t l e 
p rospec t of any immediate r e d u c t i o n s in 
European r a t e s of unemployment. 
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As d i scussed in the l a s t Commentary, the 
r e c e n t recovery in the world economy has 
no t been accompan ied by any marked 
i n c r e a s e i n i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . 
D e s p i t e t h e r a p i d growth experienced 
during 1984, in f l a t ion in the OECD area in 
the f i r s t quar ter of 1985 remained s imi lar 
t o the r a t e exper ienced in 1983. During 
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the second quarter of 1985 inflation rates 
have fallen for a number of OECD countries 
as a consequence of the cont inuing 
softness in oi l and commodity markets and 
the r educ t ions in import p r i c e s for 
countries other than the US following the 
weakening of the dollar. 
The average annual ra te of inf la t ion for 
the OECD area i s 4.7%. As in the recent 
past , t h i s average embraces divers i ty of 
experience both between North America and 
European countries and among European 
countries. The annual ra te for North 
America is 2.1% which remains well below 
the averages for OECD Europe and the EEC 
of 5.3? and 4.0% respectively. Within 
Europe inflation rates range from 2.3% for 
both West Germany and the Netherlands 
through 6.1% for France and 6.9% for the 
UK to 16.7% for Greece and 22.3% for 
Portugal. With the yen's appreciation 
reinforcing the effects on import costs of 
weak oi l and commodity pr ices , Japan's 
inf la t ion r a t e of 2.4% remains low in 
comparison to those of most European 
countries. 
As has already occurred with respect to 
growth ra tes across countries, there has 
been a recent narrowing of differentials 
in inf la t ion r a t e s . With cont inuing 
domestic austerity programmes, France and 
Italy have achieved marked reductions in 
their inflation rates over the past year. 
The pre-eminence of controlling inflation 
as a policy objective, some depreciation 
of the dollar in response to the Group of 
Five commitment to exchange intervention 
and to continuing difficulties in tackling 
the US budget deficit and signs of greater 
European success in containing unit wage 
costs will result in further narrowing of 
differentials in 1986. 
In contrast , some increase in the US 
inflation rate above i t s present level of 
3.6% i s to be expected next year. Thus 
far, the effects of dollar depreciation 
have not worked through to the inf la t ion 
r a t e and, as d iscussed in the l a s t 
Commentary, there remains some scope, 
although prof i t margins are now being 
squeezed, for higher import costs to be 
absorbed without adjustment of dollar 
pr ices . Effects of depreciation wi l l be 
f e l t nex t y e a r , however , and in 
conjunction with the impact of slowing 
productivity growth on unit wage costs 
will raise the US inflation rate. 
PROGNOSIS 
In the absence of expansionary domestic 
pol ic ies , hopes for European expansion 
res t largely with achieving exogenously-
determined reductions in i n t e re s t ra tes . 
Internat ional in te res t ra tes remain at 
historically high levels in real terms and 
the prospects for continuation of the 
pattern of gradual reductions remains 
crucially dependent on developments in the 
US. 
As argued in the l a s t Commentary, 
expansive US monetary policy permitted 
reductions in US in teres t ra tes in the 
spr ing and summer but Paul Volcker, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, has 
indicated that the l i m i t s of monetary 
expansion have been reached. Two factors 
determine those l imits: the inflationary 
implications of excessive monetary growth 
and the possible end to the hitherto "soft 
landing" experienced by the dollar were 
in t e res t ra tes to f a l l further. The 
recent G5 agreement on intervention in 
foreign exchange markets provides, at 
least potentially, an attractive mechanism 
for further easing of the dol lar . There 
i s , however, as yet no imminent solution 
to the fundamental problem of the US 
budget deficit. 
The US continues to attract a substantial 
net inflow of the world's savings to fund 
the budget def ic i t which i s l ikely to 
approach US$200bn during 1985. Recent 
Congressional debate of the Gramm-Rudman 
proposals has highlighted the difficulties 
of legislating reductions in the deficit. 
Gramm and Rudman seek to impose budget 
cei l ings and annual targets for def ic i t s 
binding on the President. Such proposals 
have generated opposition on the grounds 
that mandatory targets may have to be met 
by po l i t i c a l l y unpalatable tax increases 
and/or reductions in defence expenditure. 
Without effective US action to curb the 
deficit, dollar adjustment and i t s timing 
depends on currency markets' reactions to 
r is ing US indebtedness. The speed of 
adjustment under those circumstances could 
well differ from the recent "soft landing" 
and the attendant uncertainty severely 
constrains the prospec ts of European 
governments achieving the desired cuts in 
interest rates to foster growth. 
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